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 Science is about evaluation, persuasion and logic. In scientific debate, scientists 
collectively evaluate theories by persuading each other in regard to epistemological qualities 
such as deduction and fact. There is, however, a flaw intrinsic to evaluation-by-persuasion: an 
individual can attempt and even succeed in persuading others by asserting that their reasoning 
is logical when it is not. This is a problem since, from an epistemological perspective, it is not 
always transparent nor obvious when a persuasive assertion is actually deductively warranted. 
Empirical research upon reasoning, indeed, supports the notion that assertions are often 
strongly persuasive for reasons other than their logic. 
 The unreliability of the link between persuasion and logic raises an important 
methodological issue: how do scientists debate in a manner such that claimed but false 
“logical” arguments are ignored, and only warranted arguments get to determine theory 
preference? This need for soundness in debate is a particularly important epistemological 
concern in cases where the deductive qualities of persuasive argument are not overt, and so 
cannot be directly checked --such as when they are founded upon Bayesianism probabilistic 
coherence.  
 The argument presented here is that scientists make the qualities of probabilistic and 
nonprobabilistic inference sound (and so warranted) through how they organize their debate. 
Scientists, I argue, abide by “epistemological quality control practices” that limit the 
persuasive power of unsound arguments upon theory evaluation. Examples of such debate 
quality control practices are publicness, clarity, openness to criticism, and the collective 
promotion of attempts at theory conjecture and refutation.  
 Methodologically, these quality control practices are extralogical since they do not 
directly provide scientific inferences with additional logical warrantedness. They function 
instead in science to generate an epistemological evaluative environment in which 
persuasiveness is due, and only due, to logic (i.e. sound). Their methodological role is 
therefore to make what is warranted de papyri (in our principles of rationality – 
epistemologically competence) also what is persuasive in evaluation and debate de cognitio 
(in our exercise of such principles – epistemologically performance).  
 Several limitations exist upon the soundness of Bayesian inferential coherence – 
surreptitious revision, logical omniscience, uncertain evidence, old evidence, and new 
hypotheses. Bayesianism, as a result, can only exist if it is pursued in a debate that is 
regulated by quality control practices over its inferences (for instance, practices that ensure 
there is autonomy of inference, diligence of inference, probity of evidence, auditability of 
inference and assiduousness of conjecture). In this context, one can reinterpret Popper’s 
concern with criticism, openness, refutation and conjecture, as deriving not (as he thought) 
directly from the needs of logic, but, indirectly, from the need of scientists to create 
epistemological soundness.  
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1  Introduction 
1.1 Scientific debate and scientific inference  
 Philosophy of science has a number of established and recognized concerns such as 
examining the basis of rational theory preference and the nature of explanation. Here this 
paper introduces another topic for investigation: the epistemological importance of the 
institutions, practices and ethos that regulate the logical soundness of the debate in which 
scientists evaluate theories.  
 Intuitively, persuasion amongst scientists should be sound – that is done – and only 
done – in regard to the warrantedness provided by logical deduction combined with empirical 
fact.  
 But things are not so epistemologically simple. For example, (i) our facts are often 
contaminated by artefacts, inadequate controls, and misunderstood statistics; and (ii) our 
cognitive attempts at deduction are often compromised by prior convictions, confirmation 
biases, bounded rationality, self-interest, deference, and anxieties about how the outcome of a 
theory evaluation might determine personal career advancement.  
 As a result, empirical and deductive claims that are treated and considered in scientific 
evaluation to be valid, might often seem to present these qualities to scientists when, in fact, 
they lack empirical or deductive warrantedness.  
 Scientific evaluation, however, if it is to be epistemologically rational, must be 
exclusively based on logically warranted assertions.  
 This raises the question of how scientists can engage in epistemologically sound 
debate when making preferences between theories. Can institutional and other practices be 
added to scientific debate that act to prevent it from being corrupted by the presence of 
assertions that persuade in regard to false logicalness or warrantedness? This piece explores 
this methodological problem, and argues for the proposal that scientists have developed 
alongside experiments and theoretical analysis, methodological procedures that function to 
prevent unsound theory evaluation. These procedures will be called here “epistemological 
quality control practices”. These practices are embedded in the institutions, intellectual 
discourse and ethos of science.  
 
1.2 De papyri and de cognitio logic levels  
 One approach to articulate the above problem as a methodological issue is to 
distinguish between the existence of two epistemological levels (or realms) in which the 
logical evaluation of theories in scientific debate can be said to occur: de papyri (on paper or 
in theory), and de cognitio (through cognition, mental process, or mind). While this 
distinction is rarely made, there is much utility for those examining science and its reasoning 
to use it to formulate the nature of the process and the logical foundations of scientific debate 
(see also fig. 1 and accompanying legend for these and related concepts).  
 The realm of de papyri logic directly concerns deductions and reasons: its 
epistemological subject matter is that of the processes of the abstract and unembodied 
rationality explored by philosophers and logicians – the qualities of coherence and logic of 
propositions that exist only in theory and on paper. The realm of de cognitio logic concerns, 
instead, with what epistemologically occurs at the level of human minds as they think as 
deducers and reasoners of such propositions. It concern is with propositions as they are 
epistemologically embodied in the actual attempts of scientists to be rational in their 
cognitions, statements and assertions. The critical point here is that entities at the level of de 
papyri logic never themselves argue, believe, persuade, debate nor evaluate. These activities 
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are restricted to the people that seek and claim to use them to be rational. The principles of 
logic, however, are just that “principles”. As such they never epistemologically do anything 
by themselves. It is only at the level of de cognitio logic that arguments gain the 
epistemological quality of being claimed to be valid and warranted, and so effect the 
evaluation of scientific theories.  
 Another way of making this epistemological distinction is to note its parallel with the 
Chomskyan language competence/ performance difference. De papyri logic in the context of 
inferences about external realities is concerned with epistemological competences, while de 
cognitio reasoning about empirical data is concerned with epistemological performance. 
Epistemological competence provides a rational account of what can be inferred about reality 
that is abstract from any actual individual or community engaging in such reasoning. 
Epistemological performance concerns what can be rationally done by individuals or 
communities of individuals that seek to do so such reasoning.  
 The epistemological divide noted here between the realms of de cognitio and de 
papyri logic, and that between epistemological competence and epistemological performance, 
raises the methodological question as to how they could be linked. How can science done by 
humans at a de cognitio level make itself rational at a de papyri one? How can the 
epistemological performance of scientific reasoning link to the epistemological competence 
of making valid truth evaluating inferences? 
 Specifically, how is it possible for a community of reasoners, “scientists”, when faced 
with an argument that claims logical warrantedness, to epistemologically know that that its 
asserted argument possesses (in spite of this not being necessary), the underlying logical 
inference and deductive coherence warrantedness quality it claims. This requirement – that 
claimed inferences must be real and not “logical” only in appearances, I shall call the 
actuality requirement.  
 One solution – and it is one that this paper proposes that scientists use – is to regulate 
debate with practices that ensure that the actuality requirement is satisfied. Such practices 
allow scientists to minimize the presence amongst themselves of reasoning that is 
epistemologically unsound – that is reasoning that while it might be valid is unwarranted (it 
might be logically valid or then again it might not).  
 This raises the methodological question as to the nature of the practices that scientists 
might adopt as a community to ensure that their debate and reasoning from an methodological 
viewpoint is epistemologically sound and fulfils the actuality requirement. 
 
1.3 The actuality requirement and epistemological quality control practices 
 The argument of this paper is first, that for the scientific community, solving the 
problem of the actuality requirement and so the soundness of evaluative debate is a nontrivial 
problem. Second, as a result, a core part of science is the existence of a “reasoning craft” of 
traditions and standards used by scientists that minimize, if not eliminate over the long-term, 
the presence of false persuasiveness when they debate theories. Indeed, if we look at scientists 
when they reason, they can be seen to use methodological practices that have little direct 
connection with logic but which seem only to exist to ensure that their reasoning is 
persuasive, and only persuasive, due to logic.  
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In figure 1 (a), the situations of de cognitio and de papyri realms is illustrated. Within the de 
cognitio realm exists the persuasions, arguments and reasoning that people make with the 
information and research data used to prefer theories. This makes up epistemological 
performance. Within the de papyri realm exists the principles of logic, inference and 
deduction that can be used to make warranted theories about the objective world. This makes 
up epistemological competence.  
 
In figure 1 (b), the situation is shown to be more complex. In the de cognitio realm exists 
nonrational persuasion, and in the de papyri, nonauditability which creates the need for the 
actuality requirement that links these two realms of reasoning.  
 
In figure 1 (c), the solution offered in this paper is shown. The actuality requirement creates 
the need for quality controls upon epistemological performance. In doing this it turns its 
theory preferences in the de cognitio realm into epistemologically sound theory preferences.  
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 This paper is innovative in that those presently studying the methodology of scientific 
reasoning rarely discuss the distinction between de papyri and de cognitio epistemological 
reasoning, epistemological competence and epistemological performance, the existence of the 
actuality requirement, evaluative soundness, and so the critical methodological role and 
importance of epistemological quality control practices in scientific reasoning and debate.  
 As a result, these philosophical issues have failed to be given their due importance in 
the study of the foundations of science as a collective rational activity. The methodology of 
science as a result has focused entirely upon how scientific reasoning reflects logical 
warrantedness without covering how it also enables scientific theory preferences to be 
logically sound. 
 
2 De papyri and de cognitio levels and bayesianism 
 Bayesian probability theory provides the dominant model in the contemporary 
philosophy of science of coherent scientific inference. It is thus appropriate that the 
discussion of the above issues should be done in the context of Bayesian probability theory.  
 Bayesian probability theory is an account of de papyri reasoning. However, as an 
account of the methodology of science, Bayesian probability theory is presented not only as a 
model of epistemological competence (that is as the principles by which inferences and 
deduction might be validly made in regard to a normative model of scientific reasoning), but 
also as a model of epistemological performance (how reasoners should go about such 
reasoning). This raises the question of how adequate and complete is the account provided of 
the actual reasoning carried out by scientists. How far can its employment by scientists 
(which must necessarily exist at the de cognitio level) be epistemological sound and reflect 
logical competence at the de papyri one? Bayesian probability has been established as an 
account of epistemological coherent deduction, but is this sufficient for it to also provide a 
model of the evaluation of theories that happens in scientific debate? Do scientists, for 
example, use Bayesian probability theory -- but only in the context of them also employing 
auxiliary epistemological quality control processes that act to ensure that this is done in a 
sound manner?  
 
2.1  Bayesianism  
 Bayesianism is a system of reasoning in which 'subjective', and so hidden and non-
public measures of degrees of belief get coherently adjusted. Bayesian theory infers the 
posterior probability of a hypothesis, P(h/e & k), from its prior probability P(h/k), the 
probability of some given data P(e/k), and the likelihood of that data given that hypothesis, 
P(e/h & k). (Where k is background knowledge). Thus, given the discovery of the truth of a 
relevant new piece of data, a Bayesian can confirm (increase the probability) or disconfirm 
(decrease the probability) of a theory depending upon its previously judged priors and 
background knowledge. What is presumed but never stated is that when humans talk about 
engaging in ‘Bayesian inference’, that the assertions that they make about probability are 
based upon, and only upon, consistent and coherent adjustment given background knowledge 
made through the Bayesian rule.  
P(h/e & k) = P(h/k) P(e/h & k) 
 P(e/k) 
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2.2 Bayes’ rule and valid reasoning performance 
 However, how far is it possible to know that when individuals assert that they are 
engaged in Bayesian reasoning, that they have properly created posterior probabilities from 
priors? If this cannot be known, then the coherence and the consistency presumption of 
Bayesianism can only exist at the logical de papyri level. If so, while it might be the case that 
methodologically that Bayesianism provides the foundations of valid scientific reasoning as 
an epistemological competence, this does not entail that it provides an account of scientific 
reasoning as an epistemological performance. 
 It seems reasonable to suggest this is the situation because it is not possible to know 
whether there has been a consistent creation of posterior probabilities from priors. After all, 
nothing in the act of individuals, such as scientists, when they claim that they have coherently 
obeyed Bayes’ rule, actually allows them (or anyone else) to know that their degrees of belief 
might have not been adjusted differently (discussed below, and in Appendix 1). This situation 
exists because there is no factor in Bayesian reasoning that identifies whether a reasoner 
actually follows its rules of adjustment -- rather than merely only think and claim that is what 
they are doing.  
 For example, upon realising the truth of new evidence, a scientist when arguing for a 
theory might unconsciously fudge their priors as to the likelihood of this data given their 
background knowledge. This might happen if a scientist given evidence that at an earlier time 
that they would have found surprising (highly unlikely given their background knowledge), 
might now interpret (since they now know its truth) was not that really unexpected. 
Alternatively, they might slip into thinking that the new evidence has little relevance for 
evaluating the truth of a new theory compared to what they held when its truth was not known 
(when it was seen as an important consequent given background knowledge). This situation is 
possible due to the nonauditable nature of the background knowledge factors that construct 
the degrees of their belief. This nonauditability means that unless special precautions are 
taken, no one, not even the scientists themselves, will be aware of the existence of such post 
hoc adaptation of their priors and likelihoods. 
 This is not to overlook that the point of Bayes’ rule is that reasoners should properly 
treat priors as priors, and reason in argument such that their degrees of belief are ruled by 
deductive consistency. The problem here is that the degrees of asserted belief upon which 
Bayes’ rule operates in debate exist at the performance level, and so are not automatically 
determined by Bayes’ rule. Due to this, while degrees of belief (or confidence) might be 
claimed in argument to exist in the de papyri realm, its actual persuasive impact upon 
scientific evaluation necessarily will always be done in the de cognitio realm. Since the latter 
is not necessarily transparent to the former, it follows that inferences made de cognitio are not 
necessarily valid de papyri.  
 As a result, we can conclude that while the arguments carried out by humans in the 
light of Bayes’ rule might allow that their degrees of belief are shaped by obedience to this 
rule, they then again, might not, be so determined. For example, an individual scientist 
asserting that their arguments obey Bayes’ rule, finding data that does not support their 
theory, can at the de cognitio level fudge their prior degrees of beliefs. They can do this and 
still maintain – albeit illegitimately their “support” for it – and there is no way (without the 
additional presence of practices that audit the actual consistency of claimed Bayesian 
reasoning) by which any scientist (including the scientist themselves) can decide whether they 
in fact are, or not, post hoc fudging probabilities, and so whether they are, or not, proper 
Bayesians.  
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 The unexpectedness and novelty of new data, after all, is dependent upon the 
interpretation given it in the context of background scientific knowledge. Thus, without a 
means of auditing how such probabilities are constructed from such background knowledge, 
there is always the possibility for an after-the-fact reinterpretation whereby an individual 
researcher can be inconsistent and take priors to be different to what they would have done 
earlier. From this subtle reappreciation of probabilities, it is a short step to ad hoc 
modifications with theory and reasoning being adjusted so that the implications of 
inconvenient data can be downplayed or denied when contributed to scientific debate. Indeed, 
human cognition might go further, and use Bayes’ rule as a guide to ‘reverse engineer’ 
‘priors’ to achieve desired ‘posteriors’ in argument to give individual scientists – or indeed, 
scientists as a group, the collective illusion of having obeyed the rule. (De cognitio processes 
due to their unauditability can always masquerade themselves in this way as having been 
‘ruled’ by de papyri ones.)  
 Scientific persuasion here, of course, to be rational, must in its logical evaluations be 
like justice, in that it ‘should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be 
seen to be done’ (to quote Lord Chief Justice Hewart’s famous words from Rex v Sussex 
Justices). The problem is that the coherence of Bayesian probably adjustments when there 
cannot be any audit of their construction from background knowledge are neither reasoner 
independent nor sufficiently transparent in nature to allow of their being ‘manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done’.  
 At a theoretical level of epistemological analysis this does not matter (since it is 
concerned only with issues that exist at the de papyri level). But it does matter when the 
Bayes’ reasoning is used to explain the actual methodological basis of the persuasive 
reasoning employed (at the de cognitio one) by scientists.  
 Here daily in the lab, in the monthly journal and at the annual conference level of 
exchange of reasoning, issues of “subjectivity” and probability change are particularly crucial 
due to the fact that degrees of belief, their adjustment, and how they are constructed from 
shared background knowledge are not open to public and independent verification – the 
‘manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’ factor. As a result, this lack of transparency 
stops any human scientist (including those asserting inferences) checking the deductive 
consistency of the logical steps and modifications argued or claimed to exist between priors 
and posteriors, and so whether there has been a fudge in Bayesian reasoning. There is always 
the risk that surreptitiously dressed up pieces of ‘pseudo-inferences’ may end up wearing the 
garb and language of logic –and so the imprimatur of science. Bayesian reasoning, however 
valid on the pages of the statistics or philosophy of science textbook (which concerns only the 
de papyri level), fails to provide the needed public auditability. This is important since it 
allows (if not accompanied by auxiliary processes) that humans with their limited capacities 
(at the de cognitio one) will fool themselves and others in debate that are making proper 
deductions, when they are not. 
 In consequence, if scientists followed Bayesian theorists without supplementary 
practices, a real possibility exists that persuasion in scientific debate would be contaminated 
by non-rational or even irrational processes. This would result in their evaluations creating 
something other than a rational investigation of the objective world. Thus, whatever its merits 
as an account of inference, Bayesianism cannot on its own be an account of how scientists do 
their epistemological argument. This is not necessarily a criticism of Bayesianism, more an 
identification of an epistemological incompleteness that suggests the need for further 
philosophical investigation. Scientists might be Bayesian reasoners but only do their 
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reasoning in the context of supplementary epistemological practices that correct this 
auditability problem. This could be an interesting and fruitful area of research for 
philosophers of science. 
 
2.3  Bayesianism and auditability 
 Not all forms of deduction, it should be noted, are effected to equal degrees by this 
methodological problem. For some kinds of inferences, validity can be transparent as false 
assertions are easily checked as to whether they are invalid. (The de papyri level in such 
circumstances is transparently accessible from the de cognitio one). Propositional logic is like 
this: if an argument is laid out in terms of explicit propositions and logical operations, any 
individual can translate them into symbolic notation, and verify them on paper. Alternatively 
this can be done by a computer and appropriate software (for example, Mathematica). This is 
because propositional deductions are constructed from entities that in their nature are overt 
statements and so can have their logical warrantedness checked. 
 However, Bayesianism is not in this way auditable. Degrees of belief (or confidence 
or assurance) upon which it is based are postulated states (of mind, or of knowledge). That 
does not mean that they cannot be translated into numerical symbol statements (of values 
between zero and one). But that translation process, if it is carried out, is one that is separate 
to Bayesian reasoning, and so not part of the Bayesian process of inference. Thus, when 
humans argue propositionally, they automatically do so in publicly verifiable entities, but 
unless humans take special precautions (discussed below) when they argue in a Bayesian 
manner, the validity of their reasoning cannot be known to be warranted.  
 A number of objections to these observations about Bayesianism with replies are 
presented in Appendix 1.  
 
3 Bayesianism and the human mind 
 The problem of nonauditability arises because all evaluative reasoning is carried out 
by the human mind and so exists at the de cognitio level. Moreover, scientists and 
nonscientists use cognitive processes that are known to be innately flawed in terms of their 
capacity to enable logicalness. Methodological investigations of science cannot ignore this. 
Indeed, this is part of the interest in studying scientists and their collective reasoning. How do 
humans manage the trick (when they attempt to be scientists) of being rational in spite of 
starting out with such bad reasoning equipment?  
 Human thought has been established to be optimised for concerns different to those 
posed by logic (for example, modus tollens is both hard [Wason, 1966], and logic is argued to 
be of little importance to normal cognition [Sperber, Cara, and Girotto, 1995]). That logic is 
not immediate to our desire to reason correctly is also evidenced by history and the slowness 
with which humans appreciated and understood the basic principles of logic and probability. 
Aristotle’s ideas about logic were taken as the final word for over two thousand years; 
however, logicians now appreciate that they are inadequate to even establish simple 
mathematical proofs. The work of Thomas Bayes, whose theory was published as recently as 
1763 (and then only by a friend after he had died), has been largely ignored until recently. 
This suggests, that however much logic, consistency and Bayesian inference might be the 
basis of valid argument and persuasion, its principles are not so necessary or immediate to the 
human mind that the human mind automatically and invariably selects to use them –rather the 
opposite. Thus, humans when they attempt to think logically (rather than employ belief in 
regard to their normal concerns) face the problem of finding a way to follow the dictates of 
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proper deduction. 
 Human reasoning, in particular, faces the problem that it can take itself to be 
confidently logical when it is not. For example, psychologists have found a broad range of 
reasoning pathologies exist that reflect the boundedness of human reason such as anchor 
effects, confirmation bias, and inadequate exploration of alternatives. Individual humans in 
their attempts to be reasoners, however, show chronic blindness to these limits upon the 
warrantedness of their reasoning. For instance, as pointed out in the Psychological Review by 
Raymond Nickerson, (1996, p. 426) ‘In the context of Bayesian decision making, people 
often overestimate the completeness of the sets of hypotheses provided about the possible 
states of the world. When given a fault tree, for example, people tend to overestimate the 
probability of faults listed in the tree and to be relatively insensitive to possibility not shown 
explicitly’. As a consequence, he notes that ‘underestimation bias’ occurs, in which ‘events 
not brought to mind are overlooked and the probabilities of retrieved events are distorted 
upward’ (p. 426). 
 False assertion of validity, thus, occurs even given the best intentions to be rational. 
Empirically, this seems to be due to people evaluating ideas in two contrasting manners 
(Evans, 2003; Stanovich and West, 2000). First, by using rapid, parallel and automatic 
implicit processes that are unconscious until their conclusions end up in consciousness. 
Second, by using slow sequential ones exist that allow explicit abstract hypothetical 
inferences (Evans, 2003; Stanovich and West, 2000). Human assertion, it seems, arises from 
the parallel and automatic implicit processes without adequate supervision by the slower 
explicit sequential and logical ones: this situation makes humans vulnerable to persuading 
themselves that they are logical when they are not.  
 Due to the capacity of the mind to proclaim itself to be “logical”, and its limited 
capacity to be logical, individual humans therefore readily assert, falsely – and, in spite of 
doing so with great confidence and often strong persuasiveness -- that they have reasoned 
correctly, when they have not.  
 This failure of logical performance to be backed by logical competence, unless 
rectified, would severely impair the ability of scientists to engage in persuading each other in 
their evaluations in an epistemologically sound manner.  
 Humans in their attempts to be reasoners collectively as a result need a third faculty: 
one that acts to guarantee the integrity that they are sound in their assertions about the logical 
basis of their assertions. But scientists (like all humans) are not born such an integrity faculty. 
However scientists are not just human reasoners but human reasoners that debate within a 
culture of institutions, values, and practices. Scientists therefore can arrange to create an ethos 
of institutional practices amongst themselves that act as epistemological quality controls upon 
their debate to ensure that their debate is sound.  
 In this use of quality control practices, they are not unique – the use of quality control 
practices over human interactions in regard to abstract standards is a fairly widespread in 
games (see Appendix 2). Though not discussed here it is also central to institutional activities 
such as judicial procedure, safety regulation, airworthiness certification, ancient democracy, 
and to a limited degree, modern western politics. Regrettably, as yet, the use of such quality 
control practices, though vital to the well-being of human coexistence is not amongst scholars 
a widely appreciated nor researched aspect of society or its institutions.  
 What is novel to science as a social institution – indeed defining of the nature of 
science as human collective enterprise and a source of its success – is the use of quality 
controls by its practitioners in regard to reasoning about external realities.  
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4 Epistemological quality control practices in science 
 
As, it has been observed above, it is the human mind in its collective capacity to create 
evaluative debate, not systems of logic, that underlie rational reasoning about the world. 
Scientific debate, however, though it seeks to be based upon inference and evidence occurs 
through persuasion. This potentially makes it epistemological limited, because, as noted, there 
is no automatic transparency such that persuasive assertions made at the de cognitio level will 
necessarily reflect actual logical warrantedness at the de papyri one.  
But human rationality in science seems to epistemologically succeed. This, I suggest, is 
due to the special nature of the evaluative debate which scientists create amongst themselves. 
The collective activity of science, by design and intent, aims to generates an evaluate debate 
under the governance of epistemological practices that ruthlessly ensures the soundness of its 
evaluations. It is these practices that link the logic of the de papyri level with the assertions 
made in scientific debate at the de cognitio one.  
This raises the question as to the nature of the quality control practices that scientists 
use to ensure such soundness. As noted proportional logic can be automatically checked so 
that assertions made at the de cognitio level can be known directly to be valid at the de papyri 
one. Unfortunately, as noted, much scientific reasoning is probabilistic (if, as seems likely, it 
is well described by Bayesian inference) and so depends upon hidden coherence, and as a 
result is not overtly verifiable.  
Quality control practices can achieve epistemological soundness in scientific debate 
both in negative and positive ways (though in reality they are closely intermixed).  
• Negatively –by blocking the influences of what might be called the “pathologies of 
evaluation”. These cause factors other than truth and deduction to compete against them 
in theory evaluation. Negative quality controls by inhibiting their presence in debate 
increases the independence of a theory evaluation from such human cognitive 
weaknesses, and so the ease with which it is compromised by them.  
• Positively –by increasing the transparency of assertions to the de papyri valid inferences 
upon which scientists claim that their persuasiveness is founded. 
  
4.1  Negative Acting Quality Controls 
 As noted above, people’s reasoning is affected by diverse biases. These include not 
only the cognitive biases already mentioned but also social ones. For example:  
(a)  In general people seek to hold the ideas of their social group. Indeed for people to 
form social groups to which they feel a sense of belonging, human social psychologically 
seems to require them holding ideas in common, and engaging in activities which display 
these shared beliefs.  
(b)  People seek to be deferential in their beliefs by holding only those ideas approved by 
those with a higher status and therefore social rank over them. As with the formation of social 
groups, there appears to be a social psychological process by which the holding of ideas 
upholds dominance relationships. The social position of individuals, for instance, is threaten 
if subordinates take it upon themselves to accept as true ideas that conflict with those of their 
superiors.  
 These social disruptions of theory evaluation need to be quality controlled out of the 
scientific evaluative debate if false ideas are not to be mistakenly propagated. This is because 
they add factors that compete against the selection and preference of theories in regard to their 
rational soundness. 
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 In general this is done by the egalitarianism and social tolerance ethic in science. This 
ethic is helped by the fact that most scientists spend part of their academic career in countries 
and often cultures other than the one in which they were raised, or work with colleagues that 
are such visitors. Further, the communication of science is usually done as far as possible in a 
way that is blind to the status and cultural background of individuals. For example, most 
major science journals print on their papers only the name of an author without indicating 
whether they hold an important position such as a head of institute, or not, such as a new 
researcher, or even a student. Blinding submitted papers for peer review is also common: this 
not only removes the factor of bias against known individuals but also biases linked to 
judgements about the author’s institutional and social status. There is minimal honorific 
language in science though this is culturally widespread in many societies.  
 Another factor is the taboo against opinions and beliefs due to the personal and social 
emotional investment that associates with them. Scientists to avoid nonrational factors in 
general seek to hold as few personal opinions about scientific ideas as possible, and where 
they hold them, to be aware that they are opinions and so likely to be constructed in regard to 
nonrational biases. The general ethos of science is that assertions should not be derived from 
opinions, but opinions derived from demonstratable facts and inferences and so depend upon 
those facts and inferences, rather than any incidental personal or other emotional investment 
in them as beliefs. 
 
4.2 Positive Acting Quality Controls 
Minimizing social, affective and cognitive pathologies upon theory preference is 
insufficient to link the de cognitio and de papyri levels – there also needs to be positive 
actions. One way of doing this is by exploiting the logical asymmetry between confirmation 
and refutation (this is discussed in Appendix 3). Another way is to increase the transparency 
of claims at the de cognitio level to the de papyri one by externalising the background 
knowledge factors that shape and construct prior probabilities, likelihoods and other degrees 
of belief and confidence. This makes their adjustment in a post hoc manner difficult without 
this becoming apparent, since their basis is publicly available to others and so auditable to 
post hoc change.  
There are several ways in which such transparency can be maximized.  
 
4.2.1 Publicness 
 Every factor which shapes probabilities, likelihoods and degree of beliefs and 
confidences should be -- in so far as it can be -- arranged be made accessible and checkable 
by other scientists. Science thus needs to be driven by the ethos that what matters is always 
what is open and above board. Scientists as a result of these values, strongly reject, for 
example, hidden experiments, and personal sources of evidence, as a basis of theory support. 
In general, the only evidence that carries evaluative weight is that which can be seen to be 
autonomous from personal interests, biases and other nonlogical factors. Scientists, moreover, 
to this end have a responsibility to make as explicit as they can the procedures of their 
experimentation, statistical and data evaluation. Scientists have to explain the nature of their 
theories, why they are important, and how they fit in or not with other already accepted ideas. 
Scientists which fail to do this gain less standing -- reputation -- amongst their peers than 
those that actively make what can be made public, open and explicit.  
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4.2.2 Clarity 
 Auditing is impossible without clarity. If the factors that shape degrees of belief are to 
be independent of particular individual scientists, then they must be communicable. By 
definition, any belief held by an individual that is opaque is not communicable and so cannot 
to be judged independently of them. Therefore, scientific communication should aim to be 
clear. This again is a factor that determines a scientist’s reputation amongst their peers.  
 
4.2.3 Open debate 
 The background knowledge used to shape probabilities, likelihoods and degrees of 
belief needs to be articulated. The first attempts of any individual to specify what is relevant 
background information to any probability will not necessary capture its most pertinent 
connections. Therefore the connections between ideas and hypotheses will often need to be 
challenged to clarify and remove ambiguities, inconsistencies and incompletenesses as to how 
they might be interpreted. Scientists for that reason must engage in discourse and debate that 
spells out exactly what they are asserting, and what matters to their construction of 
probabilities so that others can follow how background knowledge shapes their inferences.  
 Particularly at the level of conferences and forums, there is a reputation effect. Certain 
conferences (and their organisers) gain standing because they are organized in an effective 
way to elicit such debate. There are many skills here that are not fully appreciated and fail to 
receive a proper investigation. At a conference, for example, there might be five minutes 
allocated for discussion at the end of each talk, and with session of talks, half an hour of 
general discussion, and at the end of the conference itself, an afternoon of free debate. The 
person in the chair can make considerable difference to quality of the debate that then 
happens. It is a vital part of the reason for attending confidences, yet there is a surprising lack 
of investigation into the skills needed if this is to be effective. One might make similar 
comments about editors and the organization of reviewers, commentaries and letter-to-the-
editor in journals.  
 
4.2.4 Criticism 
 While individual humans may be sometimes self-critical, in general, they are often, 
and indeed, usually not. Thus, it is more likely that mistakes in theories, poor specification of 
their contents and their links to background knowledge will be pointed out by others not 
personally involved, than those that are so committed, and so without career, or self-esteem 
investment in them. Science, thus, seeks to promote an ethos in which scientists expose their 
ideas to the detection of error, ambiguity and poor articulation.  
 Criticism is closely linked to open debate. It is not enough that opportunities to debate 
exist: people must seek to create ideas that they then expose to challenge, and individuals 
must exist that are prepared to criticise them. This involves not only a willingness to offer 
ideas and criticism but also an ethos that makes it safe. At a conference, a PhD student giving 
their first talk receives (or should receive) a very different reception to that given a named 
chair professor. Criticism has to be tailored so that people are encouraged to offer new ideas 
and work to improve their full exposition. A new participate in science will often make many 
errors due to unfamiliarity and anxiety. A responsible critic will make comments that 
encourage them.  
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 Indeed, this applies to all criticism. Many journals, for example, ask that reviewers 
view their task not as determining the acceptability of a submission but as offering ways of 
improving an submission irrespective of whether it should be accepted or not.  
 For example consider this statement about the reviewing policy of the journal 
Cognition (Altmann, 2007: p. 3.). 
Reviewers are reminded that they have a responsibility both to the science and to the 
authors who are trying to advance that science. This responsibility includes helping 
authors better their papers and, if necessary, better their science. The role of the editors 
and the reviewers is as much to reach a consensus on how the author could improve the 
impact of their research as it is to reach a consensus on whether a paper should be 
accepted, sent back for revision, or rejected. And if reviewers can suggest alternative, 
more accessible, ways of ‘packaging’ those hypotheses, or of packaging the data 
themselves, the review process can better serve the authors. In this regard, reviewers are 
explicitly asked to consider their role as being more akin to a mentor than to an 
examiner.  
There is a whole ethos hidden away in the carrying of science that seeks to minimize ad 
hominem remarks and ensure criticism are always constructive. The reputation of many a 
scientist is built not just on their work but their ability to identify and comment upon the 
weaknesses of other’s work in such a manner that it is not felt as a negative criticism by those 
in the audience and those at the receiving end.  
 
4.2.5 Conjectures 
 Another important part of degree of belief is the presence or absence of theorized 
alternatives. As noted above, probabilities depend upon the adequacy of the exploration of 
different possibilities. A high degree of belief in a theory, moreover, will often be held due to 
the lack of, or the suppression of, ideas that compete with that theory. Moreover, it is only in 
the context of alternatives that a theory can be fully detailed and theoretically expounded. 
Therefore, theory status needs to be constantly challenged by possible alternatives. This 
requires the seeking and the valuing of the promotion of conjectures which challenge received 
ideas. Scientists should aim to maximise the space in which theories get examined so they can 
see how data might or might not be explained by them. This again links closely with open 
debate and criticism. There is no point in open debate, if no one offers alternatives to time-
honoured ideas.  
 While, alternatives must be encouraged, they cannot of any kind. There is at the edge 
of science, many advocates of strange and wonderful ideas that if taken seriously would take 
time and resources from the debate of better ideas. It is often very hard, however, to know 
what are potentially profitable conjectures from those that are cranky and screwball. The 
history of science is full of examples where establishments stopped the debate for long 
periods of ideas (i.e. plate tectonics) that later turned out to be important not idiosyncratic. 
However, against this, the dismissal of many ideas has been shown has been in retrospect to 
be fully justified as their inappropriateness has only increased with the clarity of time. But 
equally there are cases where new ideas were readily and correctly accepted (Linus Pauling’s 
instant acceptance of Crick and Watson’s double helix model of DNA, for example), and 
where establishment outsiders were treated with appropriate encouragement (Max Planck’s 
associate editorship of Annalen der Physik and the annus mirabilis 1905 papers of patent 
clerk “third class” Albert Einstein, are an out standing example here).  
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4.2.6 Reputation 
 As noted science works to a considerable degree through the reputations that scientists 
gain in how they participate in scientific debate. Part of the ethos of science is that scientists 
hold – or should hold -- strong prejudges against those that seek to propagate their beliefs in 
ways that bypass the above quality controls and so sound evaluation.  
Cheating, for example, destroys a scientific reputation. No just in the narrow sense of 
faking data but discourse disingenuousness in any form. Spin, PR and bluff might be 
acceptable in contemporary politicians but amongst scientists engaging in such dubious 
argument tactics stops their peers taking them and their work seriously.  
Indeed, a scientist that engages in disingenuousness in regard to quality controls risks 
ceasing to be considered as a scientist. Science lives under the shadow of pseudoscience -- 
that is ideas advocated to appear to have the imprimatur of science without its substance. The 
main distinguishing feature of pseudoscience is the disingenuousness with which it evades 
evaluation done under scientific quality control practices. The separation of pseudoscience 
from science is not one of logic but one of the acceptance of the quality control practices, and 
so soundness in its evaluation by its advocates.  
 In contrast, scientists that honestly acknowledge mistakes and failings that are 
nonintentional do not get penalised. Part of science is not punishing those that go along 
research avenues that turn out to be without fruit. At conferences, audiences have been known 
to applaud speakers that accept a theory long held by them is not worth -- in view of new data 
-- further investigation. Science is not only about advocating bold conjectures but dropping 
ones they have ease to merit more backing. 
 None of the above quality control practices touches upon whether a theory is true or 
not. A theory might be true irresponsive of how it is evaluated. There is no logical reason, for 
example, why a theory propagated due to a dictator’s diktat without open debate, clarity, 
criticism or competing alternative conjectures need necessarily be false. Our intuitions might 
be that in such circumstances it is unlikely to be true. But the issue here is not such intuitions 
but the nature of soundness. Whether a theory is true or false does not determine its 
soundness since soundness is an issue of how it is evaluated. A theory which is unsoundly 
evaluated may be true, the problem is no one can know whether everyone’s confidence that it 
is true is warranted or not. Soundness is not a property of ideas but the nature of the 
evaluation to which they are exposed. It is a property created by the situation that ideas are 
evaluated by fallible humans – the problem of humans evaluating in the de cognitio world, 
not in the de papyri one in which validity exists. To bridge between them, scientists engage in 
the quality control practices such as those mentioned above. It is these that bring the validity 
of assertions made at the de cognitio level as close as is possible by human minds to their 
claimed basis in logic. It is due to quality control practices that scientists can reason 
effectively with logical deduction that exists at the de papyri level, even though they, and 
their reasoning, necessarily happens in the de cognitio one.  
An analogy exists here with artefacts. Humans are weak in strength and perception but 
can act beyond their natural abilities with the assistance of machines (hoists and bulldozers) 
and optical devices (microscopes and telescopes). Science in quality control practices 
provides the human mind with a means to overcome the situation that it is frail in its innate 
reasoning capacities.  
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5 Quality control practices and Popper 
 It hardly needs to be observed that the quality control practices noted above contain 
many of the ideas and principles that Popper identified with scientific rationality. Popper, 
however, attributed their importance to the making of scientific valid inferences (the de 
papyri level). Here this paper attributes them instead to a different epistemological realm – 
the de cognitio level and the need of scientists to ensure scientific soundness.  
 This shift might explain Popper’s paradoxical better reception by scientists than by 
philosophers of science. As Popper famously noted, 'Here I am being showered with honours 
as no professional philosopher before me; yet three generations of professional philosophers 
know nothing about my work' (Bartley, 1982, p. 272). Working scientists, unlike philosophers 
of science, face daily the problem posed by their reasoning being epistemologically 
compromised when they engage in evaluative debate. They are thus acutely aware that 
accounts of scientific reasoning should explain how its inferences can be made sound at the 
de cognitio level. Those professionally studying scientific rationality, in contrast, have no 
such immediate need to be aware of the problem of epistemological soundness as they tend to 
work at the de papyri level of logical competence.  
 This might also account for the absence of philosophical interest in epistemological 
quality control practices: lacking an immediate need that forces them to be aware of the 
importance of soundness, academics studying reasoning focus nearly exclusively upon the 
paper warrantedness of scientific ideas. This has misled them to overlook the essential role in 
scientific persuasion of quality controls. Scientists, in contrast, have found it necessary from 
daily experience in evaluating theories to use quality control practices to effectively minimise 
the impact and disruption of cognitive biases and false claims.  
 Philosophers might argue against extending scientific methodology to include quality 
controls and soundness by arguing that they deal with an aspect of science – the principles of 
its logical (or de papyri) rationality – that can be isolated from its actual employment by 
scientists (de cognitio) in debate, persuasion and argument. Philosophers, in this view, have 
no interest in how scientists actually reason (they are not social anthropologists as to how 
scientists actually work at the lab bench) but instead are interested, and only interested, in the 
logical competence of argument needed to establish valid scientific conclusions.  
 However, the issues of soundness, and the validity of scientific rationality are not 
methodologically separable: the logic that backs the rationality of science requires that what is 
claimed to be actual, is, in fact, actually what is asserted. Moreover, the philosophy of 
scientific reasoning is about reasoning done by scientists, not abstract processes disembodied 
from actual reasoners that exist only upon paper. (Many methodologists, in the course of their 
work, indeed frequently cite evidence about how scientists reason in regard to such things as 
ad hocness, simplicity and so on.) Understanding this rationality is therefore not an 
“anthropology”: it is concerned with how scientists should go about exercising their 
reasoning faculties so that they actually reflect logical principles. Consider, the analogy of car 
driving: one might study how car drivers actually drive (an anthropology of car driving), but 
one might also study the principles that should determine the ‘Highway Code’ that lays down 
how they should drive if they are to do so safely (the normative requirements for safe car 
driving). What is proposed here is the later kind of study except, it concerns the requirements 
for how scientists should reason if they are to make, rather than just think they make, rational 
inferences and theory selections (for further arguments, see Appendix 4). 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
(a)  The invalid-breaking-of-rules argument 
 Bayesian theorists may object that the possibility that humans might engage in 
improper or masquerading inference in no way undermines Bayesianism as a model of 
scientific reasoning. After all, a scientist that upon finding data that goes against a theory, 
then retrospectively adjusts its prior probabilities to protect it, or that allows that their 
subjective probabilities to be adjusted inconsistently by psychological factors like 
confirmation bias, and selective attention to alternatives, is doing something other than 
Bayesian reasoning.  
 Such theorists might cite the example of chess. Here, the possibility that humans 
might make invalid moves, after all, does not stop the existence of chess tournaments. But 
this objection ignores that chess is a system of rules and practices that is intrinsically sound 
because it is an observed board game and ruled by procedures that stop cheating. As a result, 
what is claimed to take place is easily inspected as having actually taken place – moves are 
done publicly, and thus verifiable. Not only do rules exist that govern the theoretically 
permissive moves of chess pieces but also practices exist that ensure that human chess players 
abide by these rules: for example, a player, once they have touched it with his or her hand, is 
required to move a piece (see appendix 2 (b)). That the pieces and their moves are public 
allows an opponent to analyse whether they have been played according to the rules and so 
puts them and others in a position to detect intentional and unintentional errors. The play of 
chess is therefore more than the set of theoretically permitted moves since it also includes 
practices that makes manifest the physical honest playing of them. As a consequence, its play 
happens in a manner that is transparent and auditable to the theoretical one of its rules, and so 
has in regard to them verifiable integrity. 
 For this reason, the argument based on the invalid-breaking-of-rules cannot be 
accepted: nothing in (or outside) Bayesian reasoning, except in special circumstances (such as 
those enforced by the above discussed quality control practices), methodologically acts to 
enable scientists to distinguish between real Bayesian reasoning and conscious or 
unconscious created ‘Bayesian’ pseudo-reasoning. Without such a means of detection, and 
the lack of necessary transparency between the de papyri and the de cognitio levels, 
methodologically it can never be known whether scientists on any particular occasion actually 
reasons validly in a Bayesianism way, rather than existing only in the state of believing 
themselves to reason in such a manner (while in actuality, persuading and holding ideas upon 
whimsy and capricious prejudice). The chess analogy with Bayesian theory would be chess 
done between players (perhaps having taken a drug that impairs short-term visual memory) 
that are blind and amnesic to the legitimacy or otherwise of earlier moves made by their 
opponents. Such chess playing would radically change the nature of chess – even though it 
would not stop in principle the competence and capacity to play chess – since without the 
transparency and so the cognitive ability to check for correct play, its realisation as a 
performance would be radically changed – no player could know whether an opponent won 
through good play, or by cheat. There might be chess wins and “chess wins” but no way of 
ascertaining the difference between them. 
 
(b)  Ceasing to be Bayesian argument 
 Another related objection is that scientists should not engage consciously or 
unconsciously in adjusting probabilities to fit the conclusions they covet: the rules of 
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Bayesianism reasoning exist to be obeyed, or scientists simply cease to reason in a Bayesian 
manner. But merely stating that scientists should act in a particular way is not a satisfactory 
answer since it does not tell scientists how they can know when they have engaged properly 
in Bayesian degree of belief adjustment. The logical competence to engage in Bayesian 
reasoning given by Bayes’ rule does not lead by any auditable means at the performance level 
to information about the soundness of that performance. It may be, for example, that human 
cognitions are so limited that humans in their attempt to reason cannot suppress the 
unconscious processes that surreptitiously adjust subjective probabilities, however, much they 
understand, value and seek to practice correct Bayesian reasoning. How can it be 
philosophically established that our reasoning does not exist in such a deductive topsy-turvy 
world? 
 
(c)  Bayesian theory is ‘impersonal and objective’ 
 Howson and Urbach try and minimise the methodological disadvantage of subjectivity 
by claiming that Bayesian theory is ‘impersonal and objective’ (1993, p. 419). But it is so 
only in a very special sense of the meaning of these words. As the context of their statement 
makes clear: ‘As far as the canons of correct inference are concerned, neither logic [deductive 
or Bayesian] allows freedom to individual discretion: both are quite impersonal and 
objective’. But only at the de papyri level can we assume that the canons of correct inference 
rule, and that there is no “individual discretion”. Leave that theoretical world where it can be 
specified that things happen as required on paper, and the question whether inference has 
been correctly done, or “individual discretion” in a tacit way has been exercised becomes 
important. Philosophers of science, after all, are not interested in the de papyri level by itself: 
they are concerned with the methodology of science in which actual scientists exploit the 
principles of logic to enable them to rationally evaluate theories. At this level, while the 
deductions of propositional logic are impersonal and objective (their de cognitio realisation 
makes their de papyri status transparent), those of Bayesian deduction are not. Howson and 
Urbach, in fact, acknowledge this in their words, ‘impersonal’ and ‘objective’: in the de 
papyri world, there is only reason and no individual reasoners, and so no issues of whether 
deduction is done without “individual discretion”, or not. Moreover, the book from which I 
get this quotation, is called, after all, scientific reasoning, not paper logic reasoning). The 
analogy Howson and Urbach seek to propose between the propositional and Bayesian 
deduction is therefore inappropriate. 
 
(d)  Fails in long term argument 
 Bayesians might further argue that its inferences are not hidden, or at least, do not 
need to be hidden. Individuals that claim to – but do not – engage in Bayesian reasoning will 
contribute to an activity that will show no long-term epistemological progress. They will not 
make valid deductions, and as a result, they will not improve their theories. In the long run, 
this lack of advancement will be noticeable. But, of course, this absence of success (even if it 
could be detected -- which would involve a bit of a paradox), provides no evidence about the 
consistency of adjustment in any particular case of reasoning. Lying may be fruitless, but we 
would prefer a direct means to know whether people are or are not telling fibs than the long-
run effects of false assertions.  
 
(e)  Probabilities can be made objective 
 Bayesians might also argue that the auditability problem is easily corrected. Degrees 
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of belief can in theory be made reasoner independent. This happens when they are 
transformed into numerical values. Reasoners could, if need be, when claiming to make 
Bayesian inferences therefore layout the steps of their reasoning, and so make the consistency 
of their deductions auditable to others. We can imagine a science where scientists banked 
their probability judgements in depositories specially set up to record priors, and then did 
their research; then depending upon its results openly engaged in a public adjustment of these 
probabilities. Thus, there is nothing in principle why Bayesian reasoning should be liable to 
surreptitious nonreasoning processes with people asserting themselves to be Bayesian when 
they are not. The problem here is that no important scientific discovery has been based upon 
such banked probabilities, nor is there in present science any means for scientists to do this. 
There is no public depository of probability judgements; no important journal publishes them, 
and few scientists, even if they were recorded, would take note of them. That this is not the 
practice of science is curious given Bayesian reasoning is supposed to underlie its rationality. 
Either scientists do not reason in a Bayesian manner, or they employ it in a way different to 
that suggested at present by Bayesian orientated philosophers. Further, it may be observed 
that such a science would involve separate, additional and potentially problematic processes 
that are not part of the Bayesian theory. 
 
(f)  The visual system and Bayesian theory 
It is now a commonplace in neuroscience to call the brain a “bayesian machine”. The 
visual system is well modelled, for example, in terms of Bayesian processes (Geisler & 
Kersten, 2002; Weiss, Simoncelli & Adelson, 2002). Such models, for instance, can explain 
several optical illusions and many aspects of human reasoning (see for example the articles in 
the special issue of Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.10 No.7 July 2006). It may be argued 
that human reasons likewise should be equally well modelable in terms of Bayesian 
processes. The reply here is that this paper does not deny that human reasoning should not be 
modelled in terms of Bayesian processes. This paper argues instead that successful Bayesian 
reasoning for its existence depends upon additional auxiliary extralogical processes to create 
soundness. There is no reason to assume that this is not also the case in the brain with the 
contribution of Bayesian processes to sight and other cognitions. The neural interactions, for 
example, that generate Bayesian processes might designed by evolution to be sound from 
corruption in how they handle information coherence and the neural equivalents of degrees of 
belief. In understand this, I suggest, there is a parallel between the foundations of neurological 
processes and those studied by philosophers of science: both need to account for how 
Bayesian information processing can be done on processes that are not Bayesian and perhaps 
even antagonistic to it.  
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APPENDIX 2 
 
(a)  Rules and quality control practices 
 Scientists are not alone in using quality controls. Indeed, avoiding falsity or 
defectiveness masquerading as “validity” or “functional” is a common problem throughout 
human affairs.  
 It is, for example, the problem of “is what is on the label in the box?” It is a property 
of complex manufactured goods such as electrical ones that defective ones resemble in all 
respects functional ones – at least prior to their being taken out of their box and used. 
Chemical measurements also have this property: a false reading about a pollutant cannot be 
distinguished without further independent tests from a true one. In both areas, concern exists 
with “quality control” – that is with carrying out procedures that ensure that what might 
appear to be a valid working electrical goods or pollution readings are actually what they 
claim to be. Such quality control concerns the development and use of practices that ensure 
that what is on the label can be verified to be in the box: that the DVD player works to its 
specifications, rather than merely looking like one, or that the reported reading actually 
reflects the contaminates in a sample rather than only appearing to do so.  
 Scientists are thus not alone is using quality verification practices. Electrical goods 
and pollution readings, on the other hand, lack a direct parallel with the two de papyri and de 
cognitio levels of logical reasoning.  
 However, a relationship exists with them (though in an nonepistemological context) in 
games and their rules and practices. Games such as chess or contract bridge like scientific 
inference exist both at de papyri (rules) and de cognitio (play) levels, and can contain 
potential “falsity” which such rules and practices “quality control” seek to inhibit or prevent.  
 
(b)  Chess 
 International tournament chess and contract bridge lay down regulations for matches. 
Some of them are rules in that they describe the game and others are practices in that describe 
how they game is played. The International Chess Federation Handbook (FIDE, 2004), for 
example lays down that:  
 
 3.2 The bishop may move to any square along a diagonal on which it stands. 
 
But it also states that. 
 
 4.1 Each move must be made with one hand only. 
 
Intuitively the first regulation is of a somewhat different nature to the second, and parallel in 
this to the de papyri/ de cognitio difference argued to exist above in logic. A game of chess 
without regulation 3.2 would not be chess as we understand it, but we could readily image a 
game of chess with a regulation different to regulation 4.1. that was still chess. For instance, it 
is difficult to see how rule 4.1. can apply to computer chess with keyboard input, and 
exceptions must apply to those lacking hands who use their toes or mouths. Regulation 3.2. is 
a rule, while 4.1. is a practice.  
 Regulation 4.1 exists because humans cheat intentionally or otherwise. Not only does 
it help to stop cheating but as importantly prevents the suspicion that cheating might have 
happened. It describes a quality control practice that creates transparency so that an actual 
  
23 
physical game of chess can be seen to follow the abstract de papyri rules laid down for the 
playing of chess. Regulation 3.2 in contrast has nothing to do with moves that might have 
been made by a slight of hand: it defines what is a right and wrong move. It is a rule.  
 
 
(c)  Contract Bridge 
 As in chess, the international organization covering contract bridge tournaments lays 
down regulations (World Bridge Federation, 1997) (in this case called “laws”) for contract 
bridge which divide into rules and practices. For example the first Law defines what a pack of 
playing cards consists of.  
 
Law 1. Duplicate Contract Bridge is played with a pack of 52 cards, consisting of 13 
cards in each of four suits. The suits rank downward in the order spades ( ), hearts ( ), 
diamonds ( ), clubs ( ). The Cards of each suit rank downward in the order Ace, 
King, Queen, Jack, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2. 
 
This “law” is a rule. It defines in part what makes a game of cards, a game of contract bridge. 
If this rule was to be different, for example, if it allowed two packs, or did not allow one of 
the suits, then the game of contract bridge would be radically different in nature. It is the de 
papyri level of contract bridge. In the collection of “laws”, however, are regulations that are 
better considered as practices that exist at the de cognitio level to enable the game to be 
engaged in by human players, for example, “law” 73 contains this subregulation.  
 
Law 73. A. 2. Calls and plays should be made without special emphasis, mannerism or 
inflection, and without undue hesitation or haste. 
 
We can imagine contract bridge being played without this rule or a very similar version of it. 
For example, in some tournaments calls are not made verbally but given through the use of 
bid boxes and players are hidden from each other by screens. This regulation does not define 
the game but ensures that the rules that define it are effected in actual play – it is a quality 
control. A player that communicated to their partner information about their cards by how 
they made a call would put them at an advantage to their opponent players.  
 In both chess and bridge, the functional difference between rules and quality control 
practices are mixed up in the regulations that govern the playing of these games. This 
probably reflects no more than a lack of concern for the distinction amongst the players of 
these games. They are interested, after all, to play their games effectively, not philosophise 
about the methodology of the regulation used to organize how they are played. But it could 
also reflect a conceptual limitation: there seems to be a general failure to recognize in human 
society this difference in these and other activities. There is, after all, as far as I can establish 
no awareness of this distinction in the analysis of science.  
 
  
24 
APPENDIX 3 
 
Selective Bayesianism 
 Scientists can increase the auditability of Bayesian reasoning in a further way that 
needs to be noted. Auditability can be enhanced by limiting deduction to those cases and 
circumstances where priors can be adjusted free of the possibility of post hoc fudging. An 
implicit assumption in Bayesian methodology is that where a probability inference can be 
made, it should be made. But there is no obligation in the application of Bayesian theory to 
reasoning to require that all opportunities to adjust prior probabilities should be exploited to 
create new posterior ones. People could decide to reason with a limited use of Bayes’ rules in 
which adjustments only take place when they are sufficiently public for them to be audited. 
This might seem epistemologically inefficient: but it would be false efficiency –if deduction 
was done in a manner that allowed people to making inferences such that they were taken to 
be valid when they were not. In other words, throwing away information can be 
methodologically rational if the alternative is nonrationality.  
Many Bayesians might not call such reasoning Bayesian, since they implicitly and 
even explicitly take it that all relevant information must be used to adjust priors. For example, 
Edward Jaynes, ‘The essence of ``honesty'' or ``objectivity'' demands that we take into 
account all the evidence we have, not just some arbitrarily chosen subset of it. Any such 
choice would amount either to ignoring evidence that we have, or presuming evidence that we 
do not have’ (1988, p. 402). But there is no obligation to reason efficiently with all the 
information that is available, if we feel that we are unable to properly process it all. After all, 
if we lack the opportunity to audit certain kinds of deduction, we can decide not to include 
them in public argument. This might slow our ability to find the truth from what might be a 
faster route in an ideal world. But not living in an ideal world, we must reason in such way 
that the fudging of degrees of belief cannot take place – auditability matters to rationality 
much more than informational efficiency. One objection Bayesians might raise is that any 
selectivity in the use of the rule might bias theory selection. However, what is proposed here 
is a methodological restriction that would exist prior to theory evaluation, and moreover, 
would exist at a public level. The application of such a restriction is thus objective and so 
auditable. Scientists, I suggest, therefore might use Bayes’ rule, but only in a cut down 
manner.  
 Bayes’ rule offers one strong public inference that can underlie such auditability: post 
hoc revision is detectable when a theory is false given some fact i.e. P(H|D) = 0, and D is 
found to be true (as noted by Howson and Urbach, 1993, p. 119). Refutation is nearly always 
an auditable inference, confirmation rarely, if ever, is. Therefore, scientists should seek where 
ever possible to reason using this limited case of Bayesian inference. If a theory entails a false 
consequence then it must be false: we must always seek to refute. Scientists to avoid 
surreptitious fudging can obey this aspect of Bayes’ rule, and ignore its potential for 
confirmations on the grounds that such belief changes are unauditable. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
The philosophical need to study this problem 
 Much discussion of scientific methodology ignores the de papyri/ de cognitio 
distinction and treats validity in the former as automatically entailing warrantedness in the 
latter. As a result, such investigation is not likely to offer an effective, complete or fully 
insightful analyse of sound reasoning, particularly as done by scientists since there is no 
automatic entailment of such warrantedness. De papyri reasoning concerns only logical 
competence, that is the ability of facts and deductions to make valid conclusions. To do this, 
de papyri logic is, and only is, a paper logic: that is, it is a process solely concerned with the 
abstract manipulation of symbols. De papyri principles of inference thus only deals with the 
capacity of such abstract entities to lead to valid deductions. As such, it says nothing about 
the epistemological principles by which humans in their attempts to reason can ensure they do 
so in a logical manner: that how in their performance as reasoners, they might actually realise 
these logical capacities. This is a problem since nothing in the nature of logic stops people 
“passing off” nonlogical assertions as logical ones.  
 Another way of putting this issue is that methodologically scientific assertions, in 
spite of appearances and claims made on their behalf do not automatically, or even 
necessarily, reflect the abstract logical entities they profess to manipulate. Assertions 
(whatever their pretence to logic) are merely words that have no direct link with logic. 
Humans use words, after all, to gain the status and persuasiveness: it is easy to suggest logical 
validity to gain approval, when in fact what is asserted is not backed by valid deduction. 
Human nature thus ensures that most assertions of logical validity are only that – assertions.  
 Since scientific methodology addresses the analysis of scientific reasoning both at the 
levels of logic (epistemological competence) and of how logic is realized (epistemological 
performance), philosophers of science need to investigate the methodology of both, and so the 
processes by which humans can rationally use facts and deductions to come to valid 
conclusions in spite of the limits of humans as reasoners.  
 This is not to deny that all aspects of reasoning done by actual scientists will always 
be of methodological concern to philosophers of science: the economic aspects of the 
processes by which science journals are edited or conferences are organized, for example, 
would seem to be irrelevant to philosophers. But philosophers cannot isolate their discussions 
of rationality and scientific methodology from the practices by which actual scientists seek to 
reason well in journals and conferences. The interest in understanding scientific knowledge, 
after all, derives much of its appeal from the success of past scientific reasoning. The study of 
science as a result must include a concern with the nature of the actual (and presumably not 
unsuccessful) attempts to reason validly about the world. Thus, philosophers must have a 
concern with the level of its de cognitio practices. Philosophers of science cannot discuss 
actual cases of scientific knowledge, and then turn around and assert that their concerns are 
confined only to theoretical reasoners. By having discussed actual cases of successful science, 
they have shown a concern not only with hypothetical processes, but with the products of 
actual and effective scientific reasoning, and so with that the methodological situation of real 
life scientific reasoning. The methodology of science, therefore, must be concerned about its 
rational performance as much as its rational competence.  
